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ABSTRACT 
A zombie world is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are identical to the 
truths in our world, but no one is phenomenally conscious. A zombie is an individual in a 
possible world whose microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths of an 
individual in our world, but who has none of the phenomenal conscious experiences of the 
individual in our world. An inverted is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical 
truths are not only identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who 
also has phenomenal conscious experiences. These experiences, however, are qualitatively 
different from the ones of the individual in our world. The first premise of Chalmers’ con-
ceivability argument against materialism is that a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted 
are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects this premise in claiming that: given that current 
physics does not allow philosophers to establish a clear concept of the physical that could 
be opposed to something else non-physical, a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are 
merely prima facie, but not ideally conceivable. This objection is called the Obscurity of the 
Physical Objection.
Key-words: Zombies, qualia, conceivability, possibility, physics.
RESUMO 
Um mundo zumbi é um mundo possível onde todas as verdades microfísicas são idênticas 
às verdades do nosso mundo, mas ninguém é fenomenalmente consciente. Um zumbi é 
um indivíduo em um mundo possível cujas verdades microfísicas são idênticas às verdades 
microfísicas de um indivíduo no nosso mundo, mas que não tem nenhuma das experiências 
fenomenais do indivíduo no nosso mundo. Um invertido é um indivíduo em um mundo 
possível cujas verdades microfísicas, não apenas são idênticas às verdades microfísicas de 
um indivíduo no nosso mundo, mas que também tem experiências conscientes fenomenais. 
Essas experiências, no entanto, são qualitativamente diferentes daqueles do indivíduo no 
nosso mundo. A primeira premissa do argumento da concebilidade de Chalmers contra o 
materialismo é que um mundo zumbi, um zumbi e um invertido são idealmente concebíveis. 
Esse artigo rejeita essa premissa ao alegar que: tendo em vista que a física contemporânea 
não permite que filósofos estabeleçam um conceito claro de físico que poderia ser oposto 
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Introduction
Let us start by taking three steps. First, a terminological 
step. P stands for all the microphysical truths of our world. 
P1 stands for the microphysical truths of an individual in our 
world. Q  stands for all phenomenal truths of our world. Q 1
stands for the phenomenal truths of an individual in our 
world. Q 2 and Q 3 stand for two different phenomenal truths. 
My second step is an imaginative one. A zombie world
is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are 
identical to the truths in our world, yet no one is phenom-
enally conscious. This case can be put formally as follows: P 
& ~Q . A zombie is an individual in a possible world whose 
microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths 
of an individual in our world, but who has none of the phe-
nomenal conscious experiences of the individual in our 
world. Formally, this case can be put as P1 & ~Q 1. Moreover, 
this case can be illustrated by the following example. When 
seeing the color purple, the individual in our world has what 
may be called a phenomenal experience: one that apparently 
can only be subjectively felt. The zombie, on the other hand, 
has no such experience. An inverted is an individual in a pos-
sible world whose microphysical truths are not only identical 
to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but 
who also has phenomenal conscious experiences. His phe-
nomenal conscious experiences, however, are qualitatively 
different from the ones of the individual in our world. For 
instance, upon eating the same type of food, the individual 
in our world tastes raspberry (Q 2) while his inverted coun-
terpart in a possible world tastes strawberry (Q 3). Formally 
put, the case of the inverted stands as P1 & Q 3. From now on, I 
will refer to the set containing a zombie world, a zombie and 
an inverted as the qualia trilogy, which I will technically put 
as PT & ~Q T.  
My third step is an argumentative step. Consider what 
may be called the straightforward conceivability argument
against materialism – an argument that starts with an epis-
temological premise (P.1.), passes to a modal thesis (P.2.) and, 
then, to a metaphysical thesis (P.3.), before it arrives at its con-
clusion (C.) as follows:
Materialism’s Thesis: PT & ~Q T is not possible.
P.1. PT & ~Q T is conceivable.
P.2. If PT & ~Q T is conceivable, PT&~Q T is possible.
P.3. If PT & ~Q T is possible, materialism is false.
C. Materialism is false.
This paper’s main claim is that, despite its intuitive appeal 
to dualists of all sorts, the qualia trilogy is merely prima facie, 
but not ideally conceivable. This is because current physics 
does not allow philosophers to est ablish a clear concept of the 
physical to which something else non-physical could be op-
posed. I emphasize that my main claim is not merely directed 
to the straightforward conceivability argument. Rather, my 
aim is to cast doubt on the first premise of Chalmers’ (2010c) 
latest formulation of the conceivability argument. This will 
require more conceptual work. So, allow me to est ablish two 
back-up claims in the first two sections of the paper before I 
present what I will call the Obscurity of the Physical Objection
to Chalmers’ conceivability argument in the last section. 
Chalmers’ Conceivability 
Argument
The first back-up claim that I have in mind is that 
Chalmers’ (2010c) conceivability argument is a refined ver-
sion of the straightforward conceivability argument.
A. Conceivability
Chalmers’ first refinement step is to claim that conceiv-
ability can be qualified in three ways. First, conceivability can 
be either prima facie or ideal. The prima facie conceivabili-
ty is restricted to a subject’s contingent cognitive limitations, 
whereas the ideal abstracts away from those limitations and 
cannot be ruled out a priori, even on ideal rational reflection. 
Chalmers exemplifies his point by stating that while the affir-
mation and the negation of Goldbach’s conjecture3 are prima 
facie conceivable, one of them is not ideally conceivable. For 
Chalmers, the three cases that form the qualia trilogy are not 
merely prima facie, but ideally conceivable. 
Second, conceivability can be either negative or positive. 
Negative conceivability is what cannot be ruled out through a 
priori reasoning; positive conceivability is what one has the abil-
ity to form a conception. For Chalmers, the qualia trilogy could 
be either thought as negative or as positive conceivable.Third, 
conceivability can be either primary or secondary. Primary con-
ceivability is achieved by a priori reasoning; secondary conceiv-
ao de algo não físico, um mundo zumbi, um zumbi e um invertido são meramente concebí-
veis prima facie, mas não idealmente. Essa objeção é chamada de Objeção do Obscuran-
tismo do Físico.
Palavras-chave: Zumbis, qualia, concebilidade, possibilidade, física.
3 The Goldbach’s conjecture states that every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two primes.
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ability depends on a posteriori factors. For instance, “water is not 
H
2
O” (NotW) can be thought by a priori reasoning. Hence, it is 
primarily conceivable.  However, NotW is not secondarily con-
ceivable, as contemporary chemistry has a posteriori evidence 
that shows that “water is H
2
O” (YesW).  Like NotW, the qualia 
trilogy is primarily conceivable in Chalmers’ view. Unlike NotW, 
however, Chalmers claims that we do not have any empirical ev-
idence to support the denial of the qualia trilogy.
B. Possibility
Chalmers’ second refinement step is to claim that possi-
bility can either be primary or secondary. He does so by relying 
on his two-dimensional notion of modality as follows.  
A possible world can be viewed in two ways: as a cen-
tered world or as a counterfactual world. When a statement 
is verifiable as true in a centered world, it is primary possi-
ble (or 1-possible). When a statement is satisfiable as true in 
a counterfactual world, it is secondary possible (or 2-possible). 
The NotW example can help us illustrate Chalmers’ position 
here. Imagine a possible world in which NotW is the case. On 
the one hand, if we take the NotW world as a centered world 
qualitatively identical to our world, its “primary intension” is 
verifiable, and the statement would be 1-possible.  In other 
words, if the NotW world were the case (taken as a centered 
world), water would not be H
2
O (it would be XYZ, for ex-
ample). On the other hand, a NotW world does not satisfy 
what Chalmers calls “the secondary intension” of NotW. 
This statement, then, is not 2-possible, for we know that in 
all possible worlds where there is water, it is H
2
O. To put it 
differently, if the NotW world were the case (taken as a coun-
terfactual world), water would still have been H
2
O. Chalmers’ 
point is that the analogy between the NotW world and the 
qualia trilogy case is not complete. Distinct from the former, 
the latter would be both 1-possible and 2-possible. This is to 
state not only that if the qualia trilogy (taken as a centered 
world) were the case, PT & ~Q T would hold, but also that if 
the qualia trilogy (taken as a counterfactual world) were the 
case, PT & ~Q T would hold. Chalmers argues that in this case 
the primary and secondary intensions of PT & ~Q T coincide. 
Something could resemble and be verifiable as water in a cen-
tered world and yet be something else not satisfiable as water 
in a counterfactual world. For Chalmers, nevertheless, the 
same does not apply to phenomenal experience. If something 
is verifiable as a phenomenal experience in a centered world, 
something is also satisfiable as a phenomenal experience in a 
counterfactual world. More directly, there is no pseudo phe-
nomenal experience. “It is plausibly the case”, Chalmers states in 
this sense, “that anything that feels like consciousness is con-
sciousness” (Chalmers, 2010c, p. 150).  
C. A Refined Conceivability Argument
Using the distinctions discussed above, Chalmers refines 
the straightforward conceivability argument as follows:
Materialism’s Thesis: PT&~Q T is not possible.
P.1. PT & ~Q T is ideally negative / positive primary 
conceivable.
P.2. If PT & ~Q T is ideally negative / positive primary con-
ceivable, PT &~Q T is 1-possible.
P.3. If PT & ~Q T is 1-possible, P
T & ~Q T is 2-possible.
P.4. If PT & ~Q T is 2-possible, materialism is false.
C. Materialism is false.
If the above argument is valid, one has reasons to endorse 
Chalmers’ version of property dualism, namely, naturalistic du-
alism. “It is naturalistic,” Chalmers tells us, “because it posits that 
everything is a consequence of a network of basic properties 
and laws, and because it is compatible with all the results of 
contemporary science” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 128).  This view is 
dualistic because it entails that Q  cannot be reduced and does 
not supervene on P. For Chalmers, this would follow from the 
conclusion that materialism is false. Now note that, according 
to Chalmers, Q  cannot be reduced and does not supervene on P
because “phenomenal properties seem to be intrinsic properties 
that are hard to fit in with the structural-dynamic charact er of 
physical theory” (Chalmers, 2010a, p. 133). “Arguably”, Chalm-
ers emphasizes, such phenomenal properties “are the only in-
trinsic properties that we have direct knowledge of ” (Chalmers, 
2010a, p. 133). By a “direct knowledge”, I interpret that Chalm-
ers means some kind of knowledge that we gain through in-
trosp ection. Also note that Chalmers states the following: “I 
believe that I am conscious, that I have states with remarkable 
qualitative charact er available to introsp ection, that these states 
resist transparent reductive explanation, and so on” (Chalmers, 
2010b, p. 317). Accordingly, what seems to motivate Chalm-
ers’ property dualism is the view that there is a quite obvious 
and explicit gap between (so to sp eak) first person knowledge 
acquired by means of introsp ection about phenomenal expe-
rience; and third person knowledge acquired by other means 
about the physical. 
Objections to P.1. and Replies 
by Chalmers
The second back-up claim I have in mind is that Chalm-
ers has already replied to the following two objections against 
the first premise of his previous (Chalmers, 1996) formula-
tion of the conceivability argument.
A. Prima Facie, but not Ideal 
Conceivability Objection
This objection was suggest ed by Bailey (2007) as well as by 
Van Gulick (1999) and Worley (2003). However, the reasons of 
the former are different from the reasons of the latter two for 
doing so. Bailey’s point is that all conceivability arguments rely 
on the notion of ideal conceivability. Nevertheless, humans will 
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never ideally conceive. Thus, not only Chalmers’, but all conceiv-
ability arguments are unsound. Instead, the view of Van Gulick 
and Worley is that someday new discoveries of future physics will 
allow us to achieve an ideal conceivability that will show that the 
qualia trilogy is only prima facie conceivable.  
In this sense, note that if one revises the first premise of 
Chalmers’ conceivability argument by stating that PT & ~Q T
is merely prima facie negative / positive primary conceivable, 
one cannot endorse the second premise’s modal thesis that PT & ~Q T is possible-1 – at least not within Chalmers’ conceptual 
framework. The matter here is that Chalmers is committed 
to modal rationalism, which can be taken as the conjunction 
of two theses: namely, (i) the modal domain can be a priori 
accessed from the rational domain, and (ii) x is part of the ra-
tional domain iff x is ideally conceivable. Thus, a philosopher 
who is committed to modal rationalism has to accept that if 
the qualia trilogy is not ideally conceivable, the qualia trilogy 
cannot be a priori linked to modality. If the qualia trilogy can-
not be linked to modality, the second premise of Chalmers’ 
conceivability argument does not follow. Without its second 
premise, Chalmers’ conceivability argument fails to est ablish 
any metaphysical conclusion against materialism. 
Chalmers replies to Bailey’s objection by stating that 
there is no reason to accept that humans cannot ideally con-
ceive. For example, it is ideally conceivable that someone 
exists and not ideally conceivable that 0 = 1. Moreover, he 
argues against Van Gulick and Worley as follows. The claim 
that a future ideal reflection will show that the qualia trilogy 
is merely prima facie conceivable requires a revision on the 
following approach toward the relation between physical 
concepts and phenomenal concepts: physical concepts are all 
structural-dynamical in charact er, whereas phenomenal con-
cepts are all intrinsic in charact er4. There are only two ways 
to revise this view. First, one can embrace eliminativism or an-
alytic functionalism: resp ectively, the view that denies the ex-
istence of phenomenal experience; and the view that argues 
that such experience is not intrinsic, but, rather, a relational 
set of functional states in a cognitive system that lead to cer-
tain behaviors. However, these positions appear to deny the 
manifest without providing compelling arguments to do so5. 
Second, one can follow Stoljar and expand our conception of 
the physical by assuming that there are also intrinsic physical 
properties. For Chalmers, this position also faces trouble.
B. Expanding the Conception of the 
Physical Objection
Stoljar (2001) formulates a distinct objection. His view is 
that there are two types of physical properties. On the one hand, 
there are theory-based physical properties (t-physical properties), 
properties that physical theory tells us about, or properties that 
metaphysically (or logically) supervene on the properties physical 
theory tells us about. On the other hand, there are object-based 
physical properties (o-physical properties), properties that physi-
cal theory does not tell us about: namely, intrinsic properties of 
paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents, or proper-
ties that metaphysically (or logically) supervene on these intrinsic 
properties. In Stoljar’s view, PT & ~Q T appears to be conceivable 
because Chalmers mistakenly assumes that there are only truths 
regarding t-physical properties within P. However, there are also 
truths regarding o-physical properties within P. Thus, the three 
cases of the qualia trilogy could not be formally put as P & ~Q , P1& ~Q 1 and P1 & Q3 in Stoljar’s view. Rather, a zombie world and 
a zombie would lack o-physical properties which would make 
them resp ectively physically distinct from our world and from 
any conscious individual in it. Furthermore, an individual in our 
world and his inverted counterpart in a possible world would 
have different o-physical properties. They would, then, be physi-
cally different from one another.
Chalmers responds to Stoljar’s objection by claiming 
that his view does not exactly count as an objection because it 
entails Russellian monism – a view which, in Chalmers’ words, 
“is certainly not ruled out by the conceivability argument” 
(Chalmers, 2010c, p. 152).  Russellian monism stands for the 
thesis that what Stoljar calls o-physical properties are proper-
ties that cannot be revealed to us either by perception (which 
only reveals their effects) or by science (which reveals only 
their relations). Depending on the version of Russellian mo-
nism, these properties can be taken either as phenomenal or 
as protophenomenal physical properties, that is, properties that 
may (as it is the case with humans) or may not (as it is the case 
with chairs) give rise to phenomenal experiences. Chalmers also 
emphasizes that the burden of proving that Russellian mo-
nism is a plausible view would fall on the objector’s shoulders. 
For no one has yet developed this view in detail and it is not 
yet clear if such a task can be accomplished.
The Obscurity of the Physical 
Objection
My own objection to the first premise of Chalmers’ con-
ceivability argument is also that the qualia trilogy is merely prima 
facie, but not ideally conceivable. However, my reason for taking 
such a stand is that current physics does not allow philosophers 
to est ablish a clear concept of the physical to which one could 
oppose something else non-physical – say, Q , Q
1
, etc. I call this 
objection the Obscurity of the Physical Objection. I claim that this 
objection significantly differentiates itself from the above objec-
tions. In what follows, I would like to justify such a claim by re-
thinking the objections presented in the last section.
4 See Tye (2009) for a more detailed approach to phenomenal concepts.
5 Chalmers (2010a) argues for this considerably debatable claim at length, but I unfortunately do not have the space to approach it in 
more detail here.
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A. Rethinking the Prima Facie, but not 
Ideal Conceivability Objection I: 
Bailey’s View
As far as I am concerned, Chalmers may be right in 
claiming that Bailey’s paper fails to make a convincing case 
for the thesis that humans will never ideally conceive any-
thing whatsoever. However, it is important to emphasize that 
one does not have to be committed to the view that there is 
no ideal conceivability to cast doubt on the first premise of 
Chalmers’ conceivability argument. Instead, all it takes to rule 
out such a premise is the considerably weaker thesis that the 
qualia trilogy is not ideally conceivable. Most importantly, 
note that Chalmers does not take into account two import-
ant concluding remarks made by Bailey. The remarks I am 
thinking are the following ones.  Remark 1: “Chalmers pre-
supposes that we have adequately complete knowledge of the 
microphysical subvenients for conscious experience” (Bailey, 
2007, p. 13). Remark 2: “there is currently no reason at all to 
think our knowledge of the physics of consciousness is com-
plete” (Bailey, 2007, p. 13). My view is that, even though Bai-
ley’s objection does not follow, his concluding remarks do. In 
this sense, consider that the notion of “conception of nature” 
is in the core of Chalmers’ formulation of the mind / body 
problem. The matter is that one can argue that Q  “fits uneasily 
into our conception of the natural world” (Chalmers, 2010a, 
p. 103) iff one assumes that we hold a complete conception 
of P. More directly, in order to oppose P to something else, 
it is necessary to know what P is. Chalmers assumes that we 
currently have this knowledge when he claims that all mem-
bers of P are structural-dynamical, whereas all members of Q
have an intrinsic charact er. In doing so, he repeats a Cartesian 
move within a 21st century scientific context that does not 
seem to allow it.  Let me justify this last point with the help of 
some historical background given by Chomsky (1993).
In the 17th century, Descartes took “thinking” (res cogi-
tans) as the mind’s only essential property. Further, he defend-
ed the thesis that for every x, such that x is a member of P, 
x has “extension” (res extensa) as its single essential proper-
ty. Thus, Descartes held a precise concept of the physical by 
means of which he could endorse the following conceivability 
claim. As “extension” (res extensa) ≠ “thinking” (res cogitans), 
one can have a clear and distinct idea of the body and the 
soul as distinct substances. Chalmers’ point is quite similar: 
namely, that, as “structural-dynamical” ≠ “intrinsic”, the qual-
ia trilogy is ideally conceivable. The problem is that Newton 
ruled out the Cartesian restricted and precise conception of 
the physical when he postulated the existence of non-extend-
ed forces. Ever since, we are left with concepts of “physical” or 
“material” that resist to precise definition. In this sense, take 
into consideration the following passage by Chomsky:
Ninety percent of the matter of the uni-
verse,” physicists tell us, “is what is now 
called dark matter – dark because we don’t 
see it; dark because we don’t know what 
it is,” indeed, “we do not have the slight-
est idea of what 90 percent of the world is 
made of.” (Weisskopf 1989) Suppose the 
dark matter turns out to be crucially differ-
ent from the 10 per cent of the world about 
which there are some ideas. The possibility 
cannot be discounted in principle; stranger 
things have been accepted in modern sci-
ence.  Nor can it be excluded in the case 
of theories of mind (Chomsky, 1993, p. 85).
This is to say that the question “what is the physical?” re-
mains open for contemporary physicists6, and does not allow 
a philosopher to complete the following formula.  For every 
x, such that x is physical, x is___________. Chalmers, on 
the other hand, problematically completes such a formula 
in pointing toward a quite simplified view of contemporary 
physics. Chalmers does so by relying on a different (regarding 
Descartes) but still considerably simple answer to the ques-
tion “what is the physical?”: the answer that the physical is 
structural-dynamical in charact er. This answer makes it con-
siderably easy for Chalmers to prove property dualism. This 
is because, as Montero (2009) underlines, “if one […] thinks 
that the mental has some sort of non-structural nature [as 
Chalmers does] and also that there is a sharp divide between 
the non-structural and the structural [as Chalmers also does], 
it is easy to be led to the view that the mental is not physical 
[as Chalmers is]” (Montero, 2009, p. 183). Against Descartes, 
Spinoza claimed in the 17th century that no “one has hitherto 
laid down the limits to the powers of the body.”7 In the 21st 
century, one can still repeat Spinoza’s claim against Chalmers 
by insisting that one cannot assume that our current knowl-
edge of the physical is complete. 
Indeed, the very notion of the “physical” seems quite 
obscure. Given this factor, I do not think that one can ide-
ally conceive a distinction between the physical and the phe-
nomenal, as Chalmers claims. As stated above, I take that 
Chalmers is motivated by the fact that we have some sort of 
“first person” knowledge acquired by means of introsp ection 
about phenomenal experience, and a third person knowledge 
acquired by other means about the physical. As far as I am 
concerned, this might be the case. However, given the obscu-
rity of the notion of the “physical”, such fact is not enough to 
back up the claim that PT & ~Q T is ideally conceivable. Rather, 
this only indicates that PT & ~Q T is prima facie conceivable. 
More directly, PT & ~Q T is merely conceivable for those, like 
Chalmers, who have the problematic dualistic intuition that 
consciousness resists any kind of third person approach. This 
intuition, though, is not enough to back up the thesis that PT 
6 See also Montero (1999, 2009), and McGinn (2011) in this sense.
7 See Spinoza (1985, Preface to Part III, note to proposition 2).
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& ~Q T is ideally conceivable. This is because physicalists of all 
sorts have a contrasting, but likewise problematic intuition: 
namely, that, to put it in Smart’s terms, “everything should 
be explicable in terms of physics […] except the occurrence 
of sensations [or phenomenal experiences] seems […] to be 
frankly unbelievable” (Smart, 1959, p. 142).
B. Rethinking the Prima Facie, but not 
Ideal Conceivability Objection II: Van 
Gulick’s and Worley’s View
Let me start to differentiate my objection from the 
views of Van Gulick and Worley by considering the following 
passage by Chalmers: “[1] physics and physical concepts are 
all structural-dynamical in charact er (and [2] new scientific 
developments are unlikely to change this)” (Chalmers, 2010c, 
p. 155, my emphasis).  Now let me emphasize that I claim that 
the qualia trilogy is not ideally conceivable today.  My view 
is that [1] is a highly problematic assumption that we have 
current reasons to resist. I am not merely claiming that future 
physics will someday show that the qualia trilogy is not ide-
ally conceivable. This is the view of Van Gulick and Worley 
who cast doubt on [2] of the above passage. I think that the 
problem with their stand is that one cannot rely on a future 
theory to rule out a current one. Otherwise, one would be 
able to rule out all current theories whatsoever by relying on 
the following type of argument. P.1. Current theory A argues 
for thesis A. P.2. Future theory B will show that thesis A does 
not hold. C.1. Thus, thesis A does not hold. It seems, howev-
er, that C.1. does not follow from P.1. and P.2. Rather, these 
premises only est ablish C.2: the view that thesis A will not 
hold in the future. The problem is that C.2. is a considerable 
weak (perhaps even trivial) conclusion because it is plausible 
to think that the majority (if not all) of our current empirical 
theories will not hold in the future – esp ecially if one thinks 
about a distant future, say, one million years from now8. Van 
Gulick and Worley merely est ablish a conclusion quite sim-
ilar to C.2.: that the qualia trilogy will be ruled out by ideal 
reflection in the future. My view is that this conclusion seems 
to be almost trivially true, as the majority (if not all) current 
philosophical arguments may not hold in a distant future.  
I agree with certain points made by Van Gulick and Worley, 
though. First, because I fail to see Chalmers’ reasons for assuming 
that future-physics is unlikely to change. It is obviously more like-
ly that future-physics – from a thousand, a million years from 
now, etc – will be drastically different from our current physics. 
Second, because I do not think that the one who claims that the 
qualia trilogy will be ruled out by future ideal reflection has to 
revise the dichotomy between physical concepts (structural 
dynamical) and phenomenal concepts (intrinsic) by assuming 
eliminativism, analytic functionalism or Russellian monism – 
three positions that are more problematic than property dualism, 
at least in Chalmers’ view. Instead, it seems that future-physics 
will allow one to conceive the relation between physical and phe-
nomenal concepts in new terms still not present in our current 
debate. The history of physics gives us reason to think like this. 
For example, the physics of Newton and Einstein did not only 
prove that Descartes’ thesis that extension is a necessary prop-
erty of every physical thing was wrong, they also dealt with the 
physical within a new conceptual framework inconceivable from 
a Cartesian point of view.  
Third, because I also take that the qualia trilogy is still 
prima facie conceivable. My point is that despite its (to use 
Putnam’s (1987) expression) lack of “clout” from current 
physics, the qualia trilogy is conceivable on an intuitive lev-
el. The problem (as stated earlier in sub-section A of second 
section) is that the second premise of Chalmers’ conceivabil-
ity argument only follows if the qualia trilogy is ideally con-
ceivable – at least as far as Chalmers remains committed to 
modal rationalism.9 Chalmers could still make a case for the 
second premise of his conceivability argument if he endorsed 
a position that may be called modal pluralism. I call modal 
pluralism after the conjunction of two theses: namely, (i) the 
modal domain can be a priori accessed from the rational do-
main, and (ii) the members of the rational domain can only 
be vaguely determined so that only upfront contradictions (of 
the form Q  and ~Q ) are excluded. The problem is that it is 
quite debatable if modal pluralism can be assumed. Note that 
one consequence that may follow from such a view is that 
all conceivability arguments are, arguably, trivial. Chalmers 
evidently does not want to embrace such a conclusion. For 
if every conceivable scenario that does not evolve an upfront 
contradiction were possible, it would be hard to justify why 
one ought to take the qualia trilogy seriously. Most impor-
tantly, nothing in Chalmers’ works suggests that he would 
endorse modal pluralism. I take, then, that if one revises the 
first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument by claim-
ing that the qualia trilogy is merely prima facie, the second 
premise does not follow and the argument fails.
C. Rethinking the Expanding the 
Conception of the Physical Objection: 
Stoljar’s View
As far as I am concerned, Chalmers’ reply to Stoljar’s objec-
tion may hold. Indeed, I fail to see the significant difference (re-
garding Chalmers’ property dualism) of assuming o-properties 
and embracing Russellian monism. The matter is that Stoljar’s 
move seems merely to replace one somehow intuitive dualism 
for another non-intuitive dualism: a (so to sp eak) “property du-
alist” dualism on phenomenal properties and physical properties 
for a (so to say) “Russellian monist” dualism on t-physical prop-
8 Nagel (1979) identifies this type of reasoning with absurd thinking.
9 For an alternative to modal rationalism, see Levine’s (2010) “modal autonomism.”
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erties and o-physical properties. Moreover, Stoljar does not seem 
to present strong reasons for postulating o-physical properties 
without relying on physics to do so. Note, however, that if phys-
ics does not have authority over the physical, it is hard to under-
stand which discipline has (or ought to have) such an authority.  
Most importantly, let me differentiate my view from Stol-
jar’s as follows. A supporter of the Expanding the Conception of 
the Physical Objection is basically stating that one ought to say 
more about the physical. In other words, Chalmers should not 
only claim that physics has t-physical properties, but also that 
the physics has o-physical properties. Note, then, that Stoljar’s 
objection is not motivated by the belief on a future expansion 
of physics. Rather, what motivates him is a representation of 
current physics distinct from Chalmers’. On the other hand, a 
supporter of the Obscurity of the Physical Objection is basical-
ly stating (on a more skeptical vein) that one ought to say less 
about the physical. This means that Chalmers should not have 
claimed to know what t-physical properties are. Moreover, as 
he should not have presupposed that he knows exactly what 
P or P1 are, he should not have opposed them to Q , Q 1 Q 2 or Q 3
and claimed that the qualia trilogy stands for cases physically 
identical to our world or to the individuals in it. Like Stoljar’s 
objection, then, my objection is not motivated by the belief on 
a future expansion of physics. Like Stoljar, what motivates me 
is a representation of current physics distinct from Chalmers’. 
Nonetheless, my representation of current physics, I believe, is 
less problematic than Stoljar’s. This is because I do not com-
mit myself to the distinction between t-physical properties and 
o-physical properties. Rather, I merely claim that contempo-
rary physics does not allow philosophers to postulate a precise 
notion of the physical. Furthermore, the Obscurity of the Physi-
cal Objection does not entail Russellian monism. Instead, from 
the premise that current physics does not provide a precise 
concept of the physical, three conclusions follow: 1. that the 
mind / body problem cannot be formulated (Chomsky, 1993); 
2. that the mind / body problem should be formulated in new 
terms which do not use the notion of the physical (Montero, 
2009); or 3. that the physical is a mystery (McGinn, 2011). 
Unfortunately, I do not have the space to compare these three 
views or to develop a fourth alternative here. However, my 
belief is that these approaches are significantly different from 
Chalmers’ stand on the mind / body problem. Thus, different 
from the Expanding the Conception of the Physical Objection, the 
Obscurity of the Physical Objection counts as an objection.
Conclusion
I conclude that the Obscurity of the Physical Objection
calls for a new reply by Chalmers.  For (as the paper’s third 
section shall have showed) it poses a different challenge to the 
first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument; a chal-
lenge that cannot be identified with those raised by the Prima 
Facie, but not Ideal Conceivability Objection or the Expanding 
the Conception of the Physical Objection presented in this pa-
per’s second section.  
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